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BOUNDS AND BEYOND: A NEED TO REEVALUATE THE
RIGHT OF PRISONER ACCESS TO THE COURTS
Steven D. Hinckley*
I.

INTRODUCTION

There is little doubt that a prisoner's most important right is
access to the courts. Without access, prisoners have neither a forum in which to question the conditions and constitutionality of
their confinement, nor an arena in which to seek vindication of
other alleged rights violations. Therefore, the right of access is the
foundation upon which other prisoners' rights are built.'
Nevertheless, the concept of a prisoner's right to legal assistance
is just passing its infancy in the historical sense. Until the early
1940's, the judiciary had steadfastly followed a policy of great deference to prison administrators regarding the internal management
of prisons. This autonomy led to abuse.2
Against this backdrop, the United States Supreme Court initiated a line of prisoner access opinions beginning in 1941 with Ex
parte Hull' and culminating in 1977 with Bounds v. Smith,4 which
radically changed a prisoner's right to gain access to the courts.
However, in the ten years since Bounds, serious doubts have arisen
concerning the continuing constitutional efficacy of that decision,
and it is clear that the right of access is currently in flux.
This article will look briefly at the history of prisoner access to
the courts from Hull through Bounds, followed by an examination
of the lower federal court opinions in which these early cases, in
particular Bounds, have been analyzed and applied. As will be
seen, the Bounds decision appears to conflict directly with other
fundamental prisoner rights cases. This dilemma calls for a reeval* Associate Law Librarian, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law; B.S.,
1976, Grand Valley State College; J.D., 1979, University of Toledo.
1. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
2. See Flores, Bounds and Reality: Lawbooks Alone Do Not a Lawyer Make, 77 LAW
LIR. J. 275, 276 (1984-85) (presents a brief historical background of this attitude of deference known as the "hands-off doctrine").
3. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
4. 430 U.S. 817.
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uation of the constitutional standards on which the right of access
is based. In fact, it is suggested that a small, but theoretically attractive group of opinions may have already articulated an acceptable constitutional standard to take the issue of prisoners' access
to the courts beyond Bounds and into the coming decade.
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: ORIGIN OF PRISONERS' RIGHT OF

ACCESS TO THE COURTS

A.

Federal Court Development of the Right

One troubling aspect of the Supreme Court's opinion in Bounds
is that the majority did not clearly identify the constitutional basis
for what it described as a fundamental right of prisoner access to
the courts.5 However, this right was not created in a vacuum; quite
to the contrary, the Bounds decision was the culmination of thirtysix years of landmark federal court decisions that markedly enhanced a prisoner's ability to seek redress of complaints before
courts of law. Prior to the 1940's, the judiciary had been loath to
interfere with the management of prisoners, preferring to defer to
the judgment of local prison authorities. The unfortunate result of
this pervasive "hands-off"' policy was that prisoners had little, if
any, access to the courts. Consequently, many potentially meritorious claims were probably never litigated.
The first major judicial reevaluation of the "hands-off doctrine"
occurred in 1941 when, in Ex parte Hull, 7 the Supreme Court

struck down a Michigan prison regulation that required prisoners
to submit habeas corpus petitions for writs and other legal documents to prison officials for "review" before allowing them to be
filed with the courts. In what at the time was a startling judicial

foray into an area that had historically been the exclusive province
of prison officials, the Court struck down the regulation, holding
that a state and its officers "may not abridge or impair petitioner's
5. In separate dissenting opinions following the Bounds decision, Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist questioned the majority's basis for characterizing the right of access
as a "fundamental constitutional right." See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 833-34 (1971)
(Burger C.J., dissenting); see id. at 837-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
6. See J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1.02 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1986);
Westling & Rasmussen, Prisoners'Access to the Courts: Legal Requirements and Practical
Realities, 16 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 273, 274-75 (1985); Comment, An Overview of Prisoners'
Rights: Part I, Access to the Courts Under Section 1983, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 957, 959-60
(1983).
7. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
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right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus."8 Further, the Court stated that the quality and content of petitions for
habeas corpus addressed to a federal court were questions that
only the court could judge.9 Although the opinion imposed no affirmative obligation upon states to ensure that prisoners in their
institutions had access to the courts, the Court did, for the first
time, express the essentially unarguable position that states must
not actively interfere with incarcerated persons' right to petition a
court to review the legality of their incarceration. 10
Although the Court issued a series of opinions following Hull"
that sought to guarantee that indigent prisoners would receive access to the courts,1 2 the next major pre-Bounds decision pertaining
to prisoner access to the courts was Johnson v. Avery. 13 At issue in
8. Id. at 549.
9. Id.
10. Id. At least one commentator has stated that the Hull Court seemed less interested in
making inroads into the long-standing "hands-off policy" than in asserting a court's "traditional jurisdictional prerogative to pass on the form and merits of a claim addressed to it."
See Potuto, The Right of PrisonerAccess: Does Bounds Have Bounds? 53 IND. L.J. 207, 208
(1977-78). Regardless, the Bounds Court cites the Hull decision as the first Supreme Court
case in which it was recognized that prisoners retain a constitutional right of access to the
courts. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821-22.
11. See Potuto, supra note 10, at 208.
12. See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (state must provide transcript of nonfelony
trial); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969) (state must provide indigent inmate
with transcript of petty offense trial); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969) (equal protection required that indigent prisoners receive transcript of habeas corpus proceeding);
Roberts v. LaValle, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (state must provide indigent inmates with transcript
of preliminary hearings); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (state must provide
indigent inmates with transcripts of post-conviction proceedings); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384
U.S. 305 (1966) (requirement that only unsuccessful and subsequently imprisoned defendants reimburse the cost of trial transcripts violates the equal protection clause); Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (release of trial transcript cannot be conditional upon a
judge's approval or the prisoner's ability to pay); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (policy
requiring that the public defender review all requests for coramn nobis transcripts violates
equal protection); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (state must provide indigent
inmates with counsel for direct appeals of their convictions); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708
(1961) (equal protection clause is violated when a state refuses to allow an indigent prisoner
to file a habeas corpus petition without paying filing fees); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252
(1959) (state violates equal protection by requiring indigent prisoners to pay filing fees
before allowing appeal to be filed); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and
Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (state's failure to provide a trial transcript or reasonable substitute to inmates unable to buy them is
tantamount to a denial of adequate and effective appellate review). But see United States v.
MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976) (transcripts need not be provided when the request was
plainly frivolous and prisoner had waived a prior opportunity to obtain such transcripts);
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 230 (1971) (state need not provide transcripts to
indigent prisoners when an adequate alternative was available, but not used).
13. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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Avery was a Tennessee prison regulation that forbade prison inmates from seeking assistance from other inmates in preparing legal documents, including applications for writs of habeas corpus.14
The state claimed that this regulation preserved prison discipline
and kept "jailhouse lawyers" from practicing law. 15 While cognizant of the state's primary role in matters of prison administration
and prisoner discipline,' the Court nevertheless ruled that the regulation violated the prisoners' constitutional right of access to the
courts since it effectively denied illiterate or poorly educated prisoners the opportunity to file habeas corpus petitions. 17 The Court
qualified its holding in several important respects; specifically,
prison officials retained the right to set reasonable limitations on
the time and location of the activities of jailhouse lawyers, 18 and to
impose punishment on inmates giving or receiving consideration
for such "legal services."'1 Avery's most important qualification
was the Court's offer of an alternative to jailhouse lawyers for
states uncomfortable with their existence. The Court held that a
state would be required to allow jailhouse lawyers unless it devised
and funded a "reasonable alternative" program designed to assist
inmates in preparing legal documents. 20 Although Avery did not
significantly change the basic Hull admonition that states must
stand neutral when prisoners seek access to the federal courts by
writ of habeas corpus, and did not go so far as to require states to
establish reasonable legal assistance programs for inmates, it did
expand upon Hull in several respects. First, the Avery Court ruled
that the effect of a regulation restricting the activity of jailhouse
lawyers could be as violative of a prisoner's right of access to the
courts as a Hull-type regulation aimed at restricting the prisoners
14. Id. at 484.
15. Id. at 485.
16. Id. at 486.
17. Id. at 487; cf. Wainwright v. Coonts, 409 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1969); United States ex
rel Stevenson v. Mancusi, 325 F. Supp. 1028 (W.D.N.Y. 1971) (extending the Supreme
Court's rationale in Avery to include all inmates). See generally J. GOBERT & N. COHEN,
supra note 6, § 2.03, at 26-28.
18. Avery, 393 U.S. at 490.
19. Id. See generally Westling & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 280-83.
20. Avery, 393 U.S. at 490. The Court went so far as to cite, with approval, the legal
assistance plans in existence in some states at the time that Avery was decided. Specifically,
the Court mentioned a program in which attorneys provided by the public defender's office
were made available to prisoners to assist with habeas corpus applications, another that
employed advanced law students to advise inmates, and still another in which members of a
local bar association volunteered their services to area prisoners. Law libraries were not
mentioned as an acceptable alternative. See id. at 489. See generally J. GOBERT & N. COHEN,
supra note 6, § 2.03, at 29-30; Westling & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 283-84.
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themselves from petitioning a court. A second and more subtle distinction between Hull and Avery was that, for the first time, the
Avery Court began to speak of alternative legal assistance programs.21 By the time Bounds was decided, the idea of alternative
approaches to prisoner access to the courts would become extremely significant.
Perhaps the single most important prisoner access opinion prior
to Bounds was Gilmore v. Lynch."2 In Gilmore, a California district
court struck down a state prison regulation excluding state and
federal reporters and annotated codes from prison libraries, holding that the regulation caused an unconstitutional denial of the
prisoners' right of access to the courts. Citing reforms that had
made it easier for affluent inmates to purchase legal materials, the
court held that serious equal protection problems would arise if
indigent prisoners could not obtain adequate legal materials in the
prison library. 23 The district court spoke of "[r]easonable access to
the courts" as a "constitutional imperative

24

that had prevailed

over a variety of state interests, and held that the state must insure this access by expending public funds to provide either adequate law libraries or legal services programs to prisoners.25 As a
consequence, the district court moved the scope of prisoner access
to the courts well beyond that expressed in Hull and Avery, stating
for the first time that state officials were required to shoulder the
affirmative burden of insuring that satisfactory means of legal assistance were available to all inmates. 26 Avery, and its predecessor
Hull, merely required that states avoid actively impeding prisoners' attempts to gain access, with the Avery court further suggesting that a state could go beyond this neutral stance and establish a legal assistance program if it chose to do so. Having broken
21. See Potuto, supra note 10, at 209-10.
22. 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15
(1971) (per curiam).
23. See Gilmore, 319 F. Supp. at 111.
24. Id. at 109. The court did not specify the constitutional derivation of this "constitutional imperative"; however, the holding did state that the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires that states provide indigent prisoners with "the tools necessary to receive adequate hearing in the courts . . . ." Id.
25. See id. at 112. The district court's opinion in Gilmore represented the first judicial
consideration of adequate law libraries as a constitutionally satisfactory means of providing
prisoner access. However, the court did recognize that, in order to provide meaningful access, prison libraries must contain similar materials to those normally used by criminal attorneys in preparing their cases. Id. at 110-11.
26. Id. at 110. See generally Potuto, supra note 10, at 210-11.
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new ground, the district court refused to provide state officials
with any concrete guidelines to use when devising the state's approach to prisoner access. Preferring instead to speak only in general terms of the kinds of legal assistance options available to the
state, the court followed the approach of prior cases and deferred
to the judgment of the Department of Corrections in establishing
either an adequate law library or a "new method of satisfying the
legal needs of its charges." 2 The district court's decision was later
affirmed by the Supreme Court in a brief opinion28 that cited,
without elaboration, Avery as the basic authority for its
conclusion. 9
Although Hull, Avery, and Gilmore had blazed a significant trail
in the area of prisoner access to the courts, each of these cases was
limited, factually, to situations in which prison officials had attempted to interfere with inmates' ability to apply for writs of
habeas corpus. Therefore, some states continued to restrict openly
prisoners' access when they sought to present other kinds of legal
claims, including allegations of civil rights violations. The Court
responded to this situation in Wolff v. McDonnell,30 by ruling that
the basic right of access is equally as applicable to prisoners bringing section 198331 actions as to those bringing habeas corpus actions.3 2 Recognizing that no inmates, including those totally or
functionally illiterate, may be denied the right to bring civil rights
actions to protect certain constitutional rights, the Court ruled
that prisons must allow jailhouse lawyers to function or develop a
reasonable alternative to assure that these claims can be articulated.33 Providing, for the first time, an explicit statement concerning the derivation of that right, the Court stated that "the right of
access to the courts, upon which Avery was premised, is founded in
the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied
the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning
27. Gilmore, 319 F. Supp. at 112, aff'g Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal.
1970).
28. See Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam).
29. See id. at 15. See generally Potuto, supra note 10, at 210-14; Comment, supra note 6,
at 964-65.
30. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
32. See Wolff, 418 U.S. 579. The Court held that the constitutional rights protected by §
1983 and habeas corpus actions are often the same and that there is "no reasonable distinction between the two forms of actions." Id. at 579-80.
33. Id.
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' However, by citviolations of fundamental constitutional rights."34
ing the due process right of access as having its foundation in Avery, it appeared that the Court had retreated from the position
articulated in Gilmore that required states to shoulder affirmative
burdens to develop plans to insure prisoner access, and instead had
returned to a position requiring only that states remain neutral
and avoid actively impeding a prisoner from advancing a claim. 5
In fact, after Wolff, a dual standard in regard to states' obligations
vis a vis prisoner access to the courts existed. At a bare minimum,
the Court clearly had ruled that states could not actively interfere
with prisoners' rights to bring habeas corpus and civil rights actions. However, in the case of habeas corpus claims, the Court imposed an affirmative burden on the state to establish either a law
library or other legal services program designed to assist prisoners
in filing for habeas corpus relief.36 Having made this careful distinction between habeas corpus petitions and civil rights actions, it
appeared that the Court had established a right of prisoner access
to the courts which was constitutionally sound and predictable in
scope. However, many issues concerning prisoner access were unresolved by Wolff and its predecessors. Fortunately, the Court
waited less than three years before it addressed these issues again.

B.

Bounds v. Smith

In Bounds v. Smith,37 the Supreme Court considered whether
North Carolina's failure to supply prison inmates with an adequate
law library, in the absence of some reasonable state-supported alternative legal assistance program, violated prisoners' constitutional right of access to the courts. Based on a review of its pris34. Id. at 579. Due process clearly requires that states must not impede the right of any
individual, whether incarcerated or not, to seek access to the courts, particularly to present
allegations that constitutional rights are being violated. Consequently, due process is a thoroughly reasonable constitutional basis for the pre-Bounds cases. See Potuto, supra note 10,
at 215-16.
35. Unfortunately, the Court does not articulate the reasons for its decision not to apply a
Gilmore-like affirmative burden on states to insure that prisoners bringing § 1983 actions
have access to an adequate law library or alternative legal assistance program. In fact,
Younger v. Gilmore is cited only briefly by the majority in Wolff. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at
578-79.
36. The Court seemingly drew the distinction between habeas corpus and civil rights actions based on its appreciation for the constitutional scope of the "Great Writ" as well as
the fact that habeas corpus actions examine the legality of the confinement more closely
than any other constitutional claim. Potuto, supra note 10, at 216.
37. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
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oner access decisions since Ex parte Hull,3 s the Court held that the
fundamental constitutional right of access had been "established
beyond doubt, '39 and that such access must be "adequate, effective, and meaningful,"4 to pass constitutional muster. Returning
to, and expanding upon, many of the principles first outlined in
Gilmore v. Lynch,4 1 and affirmed in Younger v. Gilmore,4 2 the
Court ruled that prisoners' need for legal assistance was equally
compelling in both habeas corpus and civil rights actions. 43 In either case, states must assume the affirmative duty of ensuring
meaningful access to the courts through the provision of "adequate
law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the
law."'44 In so holding, the Court specifically rejected the oft-repeated argument that prisoners are incapable of using "the tools of
the trade of the legal profession" 45 due to the inherent complexity
of the legal system and legal materials, 4 and the high rate of illit38. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
39. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821. See generally, J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 6, § 2.07,
at 38-41; Comment, A Prisoner'sConstitutionalRight to Attorney Assistance, 83 COLUM. L.
REv. 1279, 1283-84 (1983).
40. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822.
41. 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd sub nor. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15
(1971) (per curiam).
42. 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam).
43. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825. The Court expressly rejected the state's contention that
legal assistance or law libraries are not essential in filing habeas corpus petitions or civil
rights complaints since these procedures require only a statement of the facts without supporting authority. The Court stated that a knowledge of the applicable law must be applied
to the facts to determine whether a colorable claim exists and that an attorney would "verge
on incompetence" if he or she failed to research the case before proceeding. The Court held
that the need for this preliminary research was no less compelling for pro se prisoners. Id. at
825-26.
44. Id. at 828 (emphasis added). See generally J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 6, §
2.07, at 39-41; Potuto, supra note 10, at 216-20; Comment, supra note 39, at 1283-84.
45. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 826.
46. See id. at 836 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For one judge's harsh assessment of the value
of prison libraries, see Falzerano v. Collier, 535 F. Supp. 800 (D.N.J. 1982):
In this court's view, access to the fullest law library anywhere is a useless and meaningless gesture in terms of the great mass of prisoners. The bulk and complexity have
grown to such an extent that even experienced lawyers cannot function efficiently
today without the support of special tools, such as the computer research systems of
. . .LEXIS and WESTLAW. To expect untrained laymen to work with entirely unfamiliar books, whose content they cannot understand, may be worthy of Lewis Carroll, but hardly satisfies the substance of the constitutional duty.
Access to full law libraries makes about as much sense as furnishing medical services through books like: "Brain Surgery Self-Taught," or "How to Remove Your
Own Appendix," along with scalpels, drills, hemostats, sponges and sutures.
Id. at 803.
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eracy among inmates.4 7 Rather, the Court found that its experience
indicated that pro se petitioners were capable of using law books to
research and ultimately file serious and legitimate claims,4 8 making
adequate law libraries a constitutionally acceptable means of providing prisoners with access to the courts. While stopping short of
stating the specific volumes that a library should contain to insure
"adequacy," the Court's approval of North Carolina's proposed library plan,4 9 calling for the inclusion of North Carolina's statutes
and selected federal statutes, North Carolina and federal case reporters since 1960, and a small list of secondary services, 50 indirectly did establish a set of minimum collection standards to be
used in the provision of constitutionally sufficient prison law
libraries.
Having expended considerable energy in refuting many of the
arguments used to attack law libraries as vehicles of meaningful
access to the courts, the Bounds Court then completed its reaffirmation of Gilmore by stating that law libraries are but one constitutionally acceptable method of assuring such access. States, the
Court reasoned, were free to develop alternative means to achieve
the goal. 1 Indeed, the opinion noted that nearly half the states
and the District of Columbia had developed some professional or
quasi-professional legal assistance programs for prisoners." As it
had done in Gilmore, the Court listed a number of these pro47. Many post-Bounds opinions have examined the startlingly low literacy rate among

prison inmates and its effect on the ability of law libraries to serve as means of providing
meaningful access to the courts. See, e.g., Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433, 1435 (11th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 313 (1986) (citing a lower court finding that 50% of all
Florida prisoners are functionally illiterate); Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 721 (5th Cir.
1980) (library books alone cannot provide meaningful access to the courts for inmates who
are illiterate or speak no English); Battle v. Anderson, 457 F. Supp. 719, 737 (E.D. Okla.
1978) (70% of the inmate population have neither the intelligence nor the education to
conduct their own research); Wade v. Kane, 448 F. Supp. 678, 681 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (approximately 80% of all inmates seeking the services of an in-prison law clinic are unable to read

and comprehend legal reference materials, while approximately 30%-50% of the same group
are functionally illiterate), aff'd without opinion, 591 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1979).
48. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 826-27.

49. Id. at 833.
50. See id. at 819 n.4. The Court stated that, with the exception of the "questionable
omission" of Shepard's Citations and the local rules of court, the proposed collection adhered to a list approved by the American Bar Association, the American Association of Law
Libraries, and the American Correctional Association, as the minimum collection for adequate prison law libraries. Id.
51. Id. at 830. Although the states were allowed the option of establishing either law libraries or legal assistance programs, the Court stated that "[s]uch programs. . .may have a
number of advantages over libraries alone." Id. at 831.
52. Id. at 831.
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grams, 53 including training of inmates as paralegal assistants to
work under the supervision of an attorney, the use of paraprofessionals or law students as volunteers or in clinical programs, the
use of volunteer attorneys, hiring of part-time consulting attorneys, the formation of prison legal services programs complete with
full-time staff attorneys, and use of public defender and other legal
services programs.5 4 However, the Court refused to earmark any
program as more satisfactory than the others. In fact, the Court
left the development of such programs entirely to the states' discretion, holding that states would not be compelled to follow any
of the specific approaches listed in the opinion in their own legal
access programs. 5 Instead, the Court encouraged states to engage
in "local experimentation, '56 warning only that any resultant plans
would be evaluated judicially as a whole to "ascertain [their] . . .
compliance with constitutional standards. ' 57 Realizing that the
evaluative focus of any alternative legal services program centers
around its impact on an inmate's ability to prepare a petition or
complaint,5 8 it seems clear that the Court intended a very flexible
standard of adequacy that would differ from institution to institution, based on such local factors as "actual demand for legal services, the average time required to handle each case, and the availability of alternative sources of legal information."5 The Court
also anticipated that economic factors could be a legitimate consideration when choosing the program used to provide meaningful access, as long as states realize that "the cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial." 0
However, by placing the responsibility for establishing "adequate" law libraries or "reasonable" alternative legal assistance
programs totally in the hands of the states without providing a
strict framework for deciding what is adequate or reasonable, the
Bounds Court invited a wealth of prisoners' rights litigation and
effectively left each court on its own to define these terms on a
53. Id.
54. Id. See generally J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 6, § 2.03, at 29-30; § 2.06, at 3738; Westling & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 283-84.
55. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 828 n.17.
59. Westling & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 284.
60. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825; see also Ducey, Survey of Prisoner Access to the Courts:
Local Experimentation aBounds, 9 NEw ENG. J. CraM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 47, 60-62
(1983).
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case-by-case basis.6 1 Unfortunately, as the post-Bounds decisions
suggest, the Supreme Court may have missed its best opportunity
to put teeth in the fundamental constitutional right of prisoner access to the courts, by providing unequivocal minimum standards to
be followed by all states when constructing their approaches to
prisoner access. Rather than seizing the moment to abolish the
overly deferential "hands-off" doctrine, at least in an area where
constitutional rights are at stake, by demanding that states provide
truly meaningful access to prisoners, the Court dealt only in generalities and trusted the "good judgment" of the states to establish
adequate, effective, and meaningful programs.
A review of the federal court cases testing the adequacy of these
plans demonstrates the variety of law library and legal services
plans that have been designed to meet Bounds obligations. Clearly,
the courts have struggled to provide a predictable analytical framework to aid in their application of the Bounds principles that, as
one recent decision stated, "suffer for lack of internal definition
and prove far easier to state than to apply." 62
III.
A.

FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF

Bounds

General Principles

Because of the express flexibility that Bounds v. Smith63 left to
the states to fashion constitutionally acceptable programs to provide prisoners with meaningful access to the courts, similarities between state plans are somewhat rare. However, out of this confusion, several general, guiding principles have arisen that would
appear to be applicable to all right of access cases, without regard
for the specific access plan chosen by the state. The first, and perhaps most important, principle to arise from the federal cases interpreting Bounds, has been the resounding judicial approval of
the cryptic constitutional analysis provided by the Court to support its right of access to the courts.
Although the Bounds majority described the existence of a constitutional right of prisoner access to the courts as "beyond
doubt,
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

' 64

and characterized that right as "fundamental,"

See Comment, supra note 39, at 1284.
Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir. 1985).
430 U.S. 817 (1977).
Id. at 821.
Id. at 828.

5

critics
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on and off the Court openly questioned the constitutional underpinnings of that result. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, made no secret of his distaste for the theoretical bases of the
majority holding, stating that "the 'fundamental constitutional
right of access to the courts' . . . is created virtually out of whole
cloth with little or no reference to the Constitution from which it is
supposed to be derived." 66 While the Bounds Court indisputably
failed to provide an unequivocal discussion of the specific constitutional bases for its decision, it appears that the federal courts are
satisfied that the majority's reliance upon the prisoners' access
cases analyzed in the opinion established a legal foundation sufficient to support the existence of a prisoner's right of access to the
courts. While most courts have stopped short of the Fifth Circuit's
description of the right of access as "perhaps the fundamental constitutional right,"67 opinions strongly supporting the constitutionality of that right can be found in each federal circuit.6 8 Thus,
while the Court's characterization of the right of access may have
appeared overly sweeping at the time of the Bounds decision, subsequent judicial history has now removed any doubt that prisoners
have a constitutional right of access to the courts sufficiently fundamental to require that states expend funds to facilitate prisoners' exercise of that right.
66. Id. at 840 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Potuto, supra note 10, at 227. See generally
Note, Constitutional Law-Corrections-Prisoners' Constitutional Right of Access to
Courts Imposes Duty on State to Provide PrisonLaw Libraries,23 VILL. L. REv. 613, 620-22
(1977-78). Regardless of this objection, the Court itself had identified varying constitutional
sources for prisoners' right of access to the courts before its decision in Bounds. Compare
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577-80 (1974) (right of access to the courts founded in the
due process clause) and Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974) (prisoners' right of
access is a corollary of due process) with Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam)
(prisoners retain first amendment right to redress grievances) and Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956) (due process and equal protection require states to provide indigent
prisoners with trial transcripts to facilitate access to the courts). It appears that most commentators support the proposition that due process underlies the right of access. See, e.g.,
Comment, supra note 39, at 1284-1300; Note, Prisoners' Rights-Failureto Provide Adequate Law Libraries Denies Inmates' Right of Access to the Courts, 26 U. KAN. L. REv. 636,
644 (1978).
67. Cruz v. Hauck, 475 F.2d 475, 476 (5th Cir. 1973).
68. See, e.g., Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1108-10 (9th Cir. 1986); Campbell v.
Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 225 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 673 (1986); Hooten v. Jenne, 786
F.2d 692, 695 (5th Cir. 1986); Ward v. Kort, 762 F.2d 856, 858 (10th Cir. 1985); Williams v.
Wyrick, 747 F.2d 1231, 1232 (8th Cir. 1984); Holt v. Pitts, 702 F.2d 639, 640 (6th Cir. 1983);
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1981); Rich v. Zitnay, 644 F.2d
41, 43 (1st Cir. 1981); Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 911 (1979); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 189 (2d Cir. 1971) ("[tlhe Constitution protects with special solicitude a prisoner's access to the courts"), cert. denied sub nom.
Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Wade v. Kane, 448 F.
Supp. 678, 683, aff'd, 591 F.2d 1338 (3rd Cir. 1979).
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Faced with no hope of a judicial reprieve from establishing legal
access programs as mandated in Bounds, most states dutifully set
about the task of developing such programs, engaging in sometimes
lengthy periods of "local experimentation," 69 as was encouraged by
the Court. Unfortunately, instances have been uncovered in which
states have, either inadvertently or intentionally, seized upon the
Court's reluctance to establish an arbitrary time limit for compliance, and have failed to institute a legal access program capable of
passing constitutional muster.7 0 The most egregious example of
state recalcitrance was North Carolina's inability or unwillingness
to develop an acceptable access program during the eleven years
that had passed since the original federal district court mandate to
do so. 7 1 Although the district court directed the state to implement
a plan calling for either adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law within 120 days of its 1974
order, the state chose to appeal, unsuccessfully, to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 2 and the Supreme Court.7 3 Having failed to
overturn the order to establish an access program, North Carolina
developed a prison law library system which was subsequently
challenged by state inmates as constitutionally inadequate. 4 A five
year period of protracted litigation ensued, during which the state
did little to cooperate with the federal courts. Finally, the district
court took affirmative action to insure that North Carolina prisoners would receive adequate access to the courts by ordering the
state to develop a plan including, in some form, the assistance of
counsel. 5 In so doing, the North Carolina federal court, following
the example set earlier by federal district courts in Oklahoma 6
and Kentucky,77 merely extended the Supreme Court's rule allowing states to choose between the establishment of prison law
libraries and legal assistance by persons trained in the law7 8 to
cover situations in which the states fail to develop or properly i'm69.
70.
71.
court
72.
73.
74.

Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832.
Id.
The original order, submitted by Judge Larkins in 1974, is in an unreported district
opinion.
See Smith v. Bounds, 538 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
See Bounds, 430 U.S. 817.
See Smith v. Bounds, 610 F. Supp. 597, 599 (E.D.N.C. 1985).

75. Id. at 606.
76. See Battle v. Anderson, 457 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Okla. 1978).
77. See Canterino v. Wilson, 562 F. Supp. 106 (W.D. Ky. 1983).
78. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.
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plement a constitutionally sufficient prisoner access plan within a
reasonable period of time. In such cases, courts have assumed the
responsibility of fashioning a plan containing the elements that
will provide meaningful access to the courts,7 9 thus eliminating the
states' Bounds-approved option of choosing the type of legal assistance they make available to their prisoners. Therefore, while the
Supreme Court has ruled that states should be free initially to
choose among legal access programs featuring law libraries, legal
assistance plans, or some combination of the two, the federal trial
courts ultimately are responsible for insuring that states in fact develop constitutionally adequate access programs."s
States may consider economic factors when choosing the methods they will use to provide access to the courts .8s However, they
are not free to totally deny prisoners their fundamental right of
access because of a lack of financing.8 2 States also cannot defend
constitutionally deficient access programs with claims of "good
faith efforts" and "good will."'8 3 Regardless of the states' concern
for conservation of fiscal resources, the financial burden placed on
the states pales in comparison to the risk that prisoners may not
be afforded their right of access. 4
Courts interpreting Bounds have broadened the scope of the Su79. See, e.g., Smith, 610 F. Supp. at 606 (affirmative action taken because the state had
"proven itself unable or unwilling to insure that its law libraries [were] constitutionally adequate to meet its inmates' needs"); Canterino, 562 F. Supp. at 112 (state cannot reject its
constitutional responsibility of assisting inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful
legal papers); Battle, 457 F. Supp. at 737 (court assumed the responsibility of fashioning an
adequate legal access program after ruling that the state had not complied with repeated
orders to change its library plan to provide meaningful access to all prisoners).
80. This would seem to be the logical extension of the Supreme Court's admonition that
all state access plans would be evaluated by the courts "as a whole to ascertain [their] compliance with constitutional standards." See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832. Seemingly, those states
whose legal access programs are found to be lacking are subject to a possible court order
mandating the type of program to be established.
81. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825.
82. See id.; see also, e.g., Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 561 F.2d 411, 417 (1st Cir. 1977) ("[T]he
denial of a fundamental right. . . cannot be justified by reference to cost or convenience");
Cody v. Hillard, 599 F. Supp. 1025, 1062 (D.S.D. 1984) ("if the state wishes to hold inmates
in institutions, it must provide funds to maintain the inmates in a constitutional manner");
Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 167 (D. Colo. 1979) (lack of finances not a defense for
constitutional violations), aff'd in part, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1041 (1981).
83. See Ramos, 485 F. Supp. 167; cf., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) ("Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight . . . but the Government's interest . . . in
conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed.").
84. See generally Comment, supra note 39, at 1317-18.
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preme Court's holding by extending the right of access to types of
prisoners not originally considered. Indeed, county 5 and municipal8 8 jails must provide their prisoners with adequate law libraries,
absent alternative legal assistance programs, just as states must do,
regardless of the number of inmates incarcerated in a particular
jail.8 7 However, courts have held that jail authorities may not be
required to furnish Bounds access when, "because of the shortness
of incarceration the courts would not reasonably expect an inmate
to have sufficient time to petition the courts." ' Further, several
courts have posited that female prisoners must be granted the
same meaningful access to the courts that their male counterparts
within the states receive.' Finally, at least one federal circuit has
ruled that a person held under a mental commitment is entitled to
have meaningful access to the courts in the same fashion as other
prisoners.90
B.

The Prison Law Library Alternative

During the ten years since the Bounds v. Smith91 decision, the
federal courts have been inundated with cases testing the constitutionality of the various state-established prisoner access programs.
An overwhelming majority of these courts agreed, at least initially,
with the Supreme Court's mandate that the states must provide
either adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law9 2 in order to provide prisoners with meaningful
85. See, e.g., Hooten, 786 F.2d at 697; Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 624 (5th Cir.
1985); Leeds v. Watson, 630 F.2d 674, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1980); Noren v. Straw, 578 F. Supp.
1, 5 (D. Mont. 1982); Parnell v. Waldrep, 511 F. Supp. 764, 769-70 (W.D.N.C. 1981).
86. See, e.g., Harris v. Young, 718 F.2d 620, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1983); Leeke, 584 F.2d at
1340.
87. See Morrow, 768 F.2d at 624 (the number of inmates incarcerated does not alter the
jail's responsibility to insure the right of access to legal materials since the right is individual rather than group in nature). See generally Comment, The Impact of Bounds v. Smith
on City and County Jail Facilities,67 Ky. L.J. 1064 (1978-79).
88. Hooten, 786 F.2d at 697; see also Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322, 333 (5th Cir. 1975)
("inmates whose confinement is of a very temporary nature or for purposes of transfer to
other institutions" need not be afforded full Bounds access to the courts), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 917 (1976).
89. See Canterino,562 F. Supp. at 111; Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D.
Mich. 1979).
90. See Ward, 762 F.2d at 858-59.
91. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
92. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.
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access to the courts.9 However, before Younger v. Gilmore,94 the
courts historically had denied prisoners the right to engage in legal
research95 based on the assumption that inmates could not use sophisticated legal materials to raise serious and legitimate claims.
While the Bounds Court made at least a cursory defense of some
inmates' ability to use legal materials in a meaningful way, 6 there
is little question that legal assistance programs were considered the
better alternative to law libraries. 7 Thus, while a state may satisfy
its burden of establishing adequate prisoner access programs by
providing inmates with adequate law libraries, judicial reluctance
to allow prisoners to use legal materials still appears in lower court
opinions, 8 causing many states to establish law libraries only when
alternative approaches are unavailable or inadequate. 9
Regardless, many states have attempted to satisfy their duty to
provide prisoners with access to the courts through the establishment of a prison law library program. These programs frequently
have been subjected to judicial review to determine their adequacy.
Most of the resultant opinions evaluate the adequacy of inmate
93. See, e.g., Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir.
1985) ("[A] prison must provide inmates with access to an adequate law library or, in the
alternative, with adequate assistance from persons trained in the law."); Corgain v. Miller,
708 F.2d 1241, 1250 (7th Cir. 1983) (the state, not the prisoner, is free to choose between law
library and alternative legal services); Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir.
1981) ("It is the state's option to choose among the avenues of access or combinations
thereof to satisfy its constitutional obligation."); Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th
Cir. 1978) ("Under Bounds, the state is duty bound to assure prisoners some form of meaningful access to the courts. But states remain free to satisfy that duty in a variety of ways."),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911 (1979). McMurry v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 742, 766 (W.D. La. 1982)
(avenue chosen by the state to provide prisoner access to the courts is not important as long
as it complies with constitutional standards); Carter v. Kamka, 515 F. Supp. 825, 831 (D.
Md. 1980) (citing Bounds' flexible approach to the form that a legal access program might
take); Hall v. Maryland, 433 F. Supp. 756, 776 (D. Md. 1977), aff'd in part sub nom. Carter
v. Mandel, 573 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1978).
94. 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam).
95. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 640 (9th Cir. 1961) (state is under no
constitutional duty to provide inmates with libraries), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).
96. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 826-27. But see id. at 836 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (access to
a law library will result in pleadings possessing veneer without the substance of professional
competence).
97. The Court spoke highly of the "many imaginative" forms of legal assistance programs
devised by states and stated that these programs "may have a number of advantages over
libraries alone." Id. at 831.
98. See, e.g., McMurry, 533 F. Supp. at 767 (libraries are expensive to purchase and
maintain); Boulies v. Ricketts, 518 F. Supp. 687, 688 (D. Colo. 1981) (libraries are more
expensive and time-consuming for a state to maintain than legal assistance programs and
may provide lower quality legal assistance than programs using persons trained in the law).
99. See generally Westling & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 285.
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access to the law library with two criteria: first, the physical adequacy of the library and legal materials contained therein; and,
second, the sufficiency of inmate access to the library. 0 0
Most judicial inquiries concerning a prison law library's physical
adequacy begin and end with an analysis of the library collection.
Although the Bounds Court approved North Carolina's proposed
law library collection, 10 ' the decision did not expressly articulate
minimum collection standards as guidance to other states and
courts. 0 2 However, a prison library must at least contain state and
federal constitutions, annotated federal code volumes containing
titles 18 and 28, all federal procedural rules, an active set of statutes for the state in which the prison lies, federal and state case
reporters from 1960 to the present, Shepards Citations for federal
and state cases, local court rules, selected treatises, indexes, and a
law dictionary.103 Some courts have stretched these minimum collection standards by requiring materials such as the complete na100. Id.
101. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 819 n.4. The proposed law library collection for North Carolina prisons contained the following materials:
North Carolina General Statutes
North Carolina Reports (1960-present)
North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports
Strong's North Carolina Index
North Carolina Rules of Court
United States Code Annotated:
Title 18
Title 28 §§ 2241-2254
Title 28 Rules of Appellate Precedure
Title 28 Rules of Civil Procedure
Title 42 §§ 1891-2010
Supreme Court Reporter (1960-present)
Federal 2d Reporter (1960-present)
Federal Supplement (1960-present)
Black's Law Dictionary
Sokol: Federal Habeas Corpus
LaFave and Scott: Criminal Law Hornbook (2 copies)
Cohen: Legal Research
Criminal Law Reporter
Palmer: Constitutional Rights of Prisoners
102. In approving this list, the Court expressly noted that it conformed with the minimum prison collection endorsed by the American Bar Association, American Correctional
Association, and the American Association of Law Libraries, with the exception of the
"questionable omission" of Shepard's Citations and local court rules. Id.
103. This minimum collection was approved in a number of post-Bounds cases. See, e.g.,
Cepulonis v. Fair, 563 F. Supp. 659, 660 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd in part and vacated in part,
732 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984); Fluhr v. Roberts, 460 F. Supp. 536, 538 (W.D. Ky. 1978); Hardwick v. Ault, 447 F. Supp. 116, 133-34 (M.D. Ga. 1978). See generally Westling & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 285-86.
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tional reporter system for the region in which the prison lies, as
well as federal and state digests covering cases from at least 1960
to the present. 10 4 In addition, it appears that the Bounds-approved
library collection would be considered deficient in the area of treatises and other secondary materials by today's standards. 10 5 Regardless of what a library's holdings catalog indicates should be
contained within the collection, most courts judge the adequacy of
a library based on the materials actually available to prisoners,
thereby placing the burden upon prison officials to review their
collections regularly to insure that all necessary materials are avail06
able, intact, and updated.
Once courts are satisfied that a prison's law library collection is
at least adequate, prisoners have little success arguing that the law
library contains insufficient materials to combat legal opponents
who have access to larger, more comprehensive collections. 0 7 Further, the courts have not found that the inherent complexity of
legal research materials requires that a prison law library be
staffed by a professional librarian. 0 8
State and federal prisons accepting custody of out-of-state prisoners transferred because of overcrowding in the transferring state,
or because of an interstate or inter-institutional agreement, cannot
be compelled to provide such prisoners with the legal materials of
104. See Kendrick v. Bland, 541 F. Supp. 21, 34 (W.D. Ky. 1981); Craig v. Hocker, 405 F.
Supp. 656, 669 (D. Nev. 1975).
105. See AMERICAN

ASSOCIATION OF

LAW

LIBRARIES,

RECOMMENDED

COLLECTIONS FOR

PRISON AND OTHER INSTITUTION LAW LIBRARIES 1-10 (rev. ed. 1985). The American Association of Law Libraries list of minimum prison law library materials, which the Bounds Court
cited approvingly, has changed drastically since its original publication in 1972. The current
list is much more comprehensive in recognition of the fact that, to be considered truly adequate, an adequate law library must contain not only statutes and court reports, but also
many basic law hornbooks, formbooks, and finding aids.
106. See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 582 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981); Kendrick v. Bland, 586 F. Supp. 1536, 1551 (W.D. Ky. 1984); cf. Rhodes v. Robinson,
612 F.2d 766, 771 (3d Cir. 1979) (discarding of outdated advance sheets did not adversely
affect prison library's adequacy since Bounds evaluation focused on the volumes retained in
a collection rather than those discarded). But see Robbins v. South, 595 F. Supp. 785, 788
(D. Mont. 1984) (stating that prison libraries may be held to a less stringent standard of
currentness and completeness than law libraries in law schools and large law firms).
107. See, e.g., Lindquist, 776 F.2d at 856 (prison library need only meet minimum constitutional standards and need not provide a library that affords prisoners with the best possible access to the courts); Dugar v. Coughlin, 613 F. Supp. 849, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (courts
will not second guess a prison's library procedures if they meet constitutional minimal standards); Robbins, 595 F. Supp. at 788 (libraries provided by prisons need not be comparable
to those found in law schools and large law firms).
108. See Kendrick, 586 F. Supp. at 1550; Fluhr, 460 F. Supp. at 537.
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the transferring state. Although these prisoners retain their constitutional right of access to the courts, the responsibility remains on
the transferring state to ensure that affected prisoners have continued access to the courts of the state in which they were originally
imprisoned, either by providing the transferring state's legal
materials to the law library in the prisoner's new penal institution,
or by providing the prisoner with the legal assistance of a person
trained in the law of the transferring state.1 09
Although the foregoing collection considerations are vital when
the adequacy of a prison library is being considered, the courts
view the question of prisoners' physical access to the library to be
of equal or greater import.110 Even the most fully stocked library is
meaningless if prisoners are not offered sufficient opportunity to
use the facility.1 However, courts have been mindful of the legitimate administrative and security concerns unique to prisons, and
have allowed reasonable library usage restrictions in certain
12
cases.1
Prison regulations limiting library access or the time, manner,
and place allotted to prisoners to conduct legal research are frequently the subject of judicial scrutiny. While restricted physical
access to the library is not unconstitutional per se," 3 courts have
109. See Rich v. Zitnay, 644 F.2d 41, 43 (lst Cir. 1981) (state may not wash its hands of
its obligation to insure access to its courts simply by transferring the prisoner out of state);
Hudson v. Israel, 594 F. Supp. 664, 669 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (transferring state must provide
either an adequate law library or adequate aid from persons trained in the law of the transferring state) (citing Brown v. Smith, 580 F. Supp. 1576, 1577-78 (M.D. Pa. 1985)).
110. See, e.g., J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 6, § 2.07, at 40.
111. See generally Westling & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 287-89.
112. Kendrick, 586 F. Supp. at 1550 ("A prison library is but one factor in the totality of
all factors bearing on inmate access to the court."); see also Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352,
357 (10th Cir. 1978) ("restricted access to the [prison] law library is not per se denial of
access to the courts").
113. See Ramos, 639 F.2d at 582-84 (regulation restricting library access to three hours
every thirteen weeks is clearly violative of inmates' constitutional rights); Nadeau v.
Helgemoe, 561 F.2d 411, 413, 418 (1st Cir. 1977) (state must provide inmates with more
than one hour of library access per week); Canterino v. Wilson, 562 F. Supp. 106, 110 (W.D.
Ky. 1983) (fifteen hours of library access per week, when combined with inexperienced inmate assistance, is unconstitutional); Jones v. Wittenburg, 509 F. Supp. 653, 683-84 (N.D.
Ohio 1980) (eighty minutes of library access per week, when combined with law student
assistance, did not satisfy rules adopted by state court). But see Hudson v. Robinson, 678
F.2d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 1982) (ten-day delay before notarization of document is not a denial
of right of access); Harrell v. Keohane, 621 F.2d 1059, 1060-61 (10th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)
(regulation limiting library access to five inmates at a time not a denial of prisoner's constitutional rights); Wetmore v. Fields, 458 F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (W.D. Wis. 1978) (four hours of
library access per day is sufficient where additional time is available to inmates facing imminent deadlines).
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not hesitated to strike down regulations adjudged to be unreasonable in light of prisoners' constitutional right of access to the
courts." 4 To pass constitutional muster, a state must convince the
courts that restrictive regulations are necessary for legitimate penal policies and objectives, and that prisoners retain some form of
meaningful access to the courts despite the restrictions." 5 The
maintenance of prison security, internal order, and discipline are
essential institutional goals which may require
the limitation or
1 6
temporary retraction of prisoners' rights.
States without compelling reasons to restrict library access or alternative legal assistance programs are compelled by the Bounds
holding to provide prisoners with direct access to an adequate law
library. 1 7 Since legal research initially involves the use of many
indexes and cross-references, any prison practice requiring inmates
to submit specific book or case requests to runners who retrieve
the requested material from the library is an unacceptable substitute for personal access by the requesting prisoner." 8
States choosing the Bounds law library alternative clearly may
114. See generally Westling & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 288-89.
115. Id. at 288.
116. Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1986); see also Campbell v. Miller,
787 F.2d 217, 228 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The security status of a prisoner may justify reasonable
steps restricting his direct access to legal materials."), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 673 (1986);
Lindquist, 776 F.2d at 858 (Constitution does not require unlimited prisoner access to a law
library); Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 932 (6th Cir. 1985) (post-riot restrictions on prisoner use of library is reasonable where alternative assistance programs and jailhouse lawyers
exist); Williams v. Wyrick, 747 F.2d 1231, 1232 (8th Cir. 1984) (regulations supported by
prison's legitimate security interest override any inconvenience they may cause prisoners);
Kendrick, 586 F. Supp. at 1550 (the existence of size constraints, which permit only a limited number of prisoners to use the law library at the same time, does not establish the
inadequacy of the library); Boston v. Stanton, 450 F. Supp. 1049, 1057 (W.D. Mo. 1978)
(inmates without imminent filing deadlines may have to wait two to three weeks for access
to the library).
117. Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir. 1985); accord Green v. Ferrell, 801
F.2d 765, 772 (5th Cir. 1986).
118. See, e.g., Green, 801 F.2d at 772 (requirement that inmates request specific volumes
from a law library without personal access or legal assistance is constitutionally inadequate);
Corgan v. Miller, 708 F.2d 1241, 1245 (7th Cir. 1983) (requirement that a prisoner know in
advance exactly what materials he needs to consult without the ability to browse the collection creates a "Catch-22"); Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1024 (5th Cir. 1979) (book
paging systems are of no use to prisoners who have no idea what to request); Martino v.
Carey, 563 F. Supp. 984, 1003-04 (D. Or. 1983) ("It is completely unrealistic to expect prisoners to know the names of law books [and cases] they will need for research . . . so that
these can be requested from a guard."). But cf. Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 606 (7th
Cir. 1986) (paging system requiring inmates to request library materials by specific citations
does not violate prisoners' access right so long as adequate reference materials are available
to the requesting party).
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impose some reasonable limitations and restrictions on library collections and prisoner access thereto; however, the ultimate burden
of showing that these restrictions do not unduly impair a prisoner's
right of access to the courts rests with corrections officials. 119 The
Bounds Court's unfortunate failure to clearly articulate minimum
standards for library adequacy forces courts to evaluate each case
on an ad hoc basis, making the true constitutional parameters of
120
prisoner library access unpredictable.
C. Alternative Legal Assistance Programs
Although the establishment of adequate prison law libraries is
one constitutionally acceptable method of assuring prisoners'
meaningful access to the courts, the Bounds v. Smith 2 ' Court did
not foreclose "alternative means to achieve that goal."'12 2 Specifically, in the absence of adequate prison law libraries, states must
implement legal assistance programs featuring some degree of professional or quasi-professional legal assistance to prisoners. 123 Stating that these programs "take many imaginative forms,' 2 4 the
Court described a number of alternative programs that could be
instituted within a prison to satisfy constitutional requirements:
1) the use of full-time staff attorneys; 2) the organization of a network of volunteer attorneys established through bar associations or
other groups; 3) the hiring of lawyers as part-time consultants;
4) the training of inmates as paralegals to work under the direction of attorneys; and 5) the use of paraprofessionals and law students. 125 However, as in the case of the law library alternative, the
Court refused to mandate any specific minimum constitutional
standards for alternative legal assistance programs, choosing to
leave the details of such programs to the individual states and penal institutions. 2 ' The sole essential feature of any program established is to enable prisoners to file petitions and complaints with
119. See generally J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 6, § 2.07, at 43-44.
120. See generally Comment, supra note 39, at 1284-85.
121. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
122. Id. at 830.
123. Id. at 831; see also Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1110 (9th Cir. 1986); Walters v. Thompson, 615 F. Supp. 330, 340 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Kendrick v. Bland, 586 F. Supp.
1536, 1552 (W.D. Ky. 1984).
124. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 831.
125. Id. The Court stated that by 1977, nearly half of the states and the District of Columbia had developed some alternative legal assistance program. Id. at 830-31.
126. Id. at 832.
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the courts which would provide prisoners, ipso facto, with "meaningful access" to the judicial system. 127 Again, as in judicial evaluations of the adequacy of prison libraries, each alternative legal assistance program established must be examined on a case-by-case
128
basis to determine its constitutional sufficiency.
As expressly anticipated and encouraged by the Bounds Court,
states implementing legal assistance programs in their prisons have
actively engaged in "local experimentation 1 29 to find the best type
of program for each institution. While many differences exist, particularly in regard to the persons actually chosen to provide prisoners with legal assistance, a number of common principles have
emerged from the lower federal courts. The courts overwhelmingly
have subscribed to the constitutional efficacy of the Bounds "alternative approach," ruling that states making legal assistance programs available to prisoners need not also establish prison law libraries. 13 0 The choice between law libraries and legal assistance
programs lies with the state. 13' Prisoners who decide not to use the
state-chosen alternative have no basis, constitutional or otherwise,
to claim violation of their access rights. 3 2 Many courts have ruled
that the mere appointment of counsel satisfies a state's constitutional duty to protect the prisoners' right of access, even in cases
127. Id. at 828 n.17; accord Carter v. Fair, 786 F.2d 433, 435 (1st Cir. 1986). See generally
Westling & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 283-84.
128. See, e.g., Mann v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79, 85 (5th Cir. 1986) (court will merely examine
the record of the instant case to determine if a prison's legal assistance program has afforded prisoner "meaningful access" to the courts).
129. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832.
130. See, e.g., Corgain v. Miller, 708 F.2d 1241, 1250 (7th Cir. 1983) (states under no duty
to provide prison law libraries when adequate alternative services are available); Spates v.
Manson, 644 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1981) (no right to state-financed library resources where
state-financed legal assistance is available); Almond v. Davis, 639 F.2d 1086, 1090 (4th Cir.
1981) (adequate legal assistance program is a viable alternative to the requirement of a law
library); Falzerano v. Collier, 535 F. Supp. 800, 803 (D.N.J. 1982) (state discharged its constitutional duty to provide access to courts by providing prisoners with lawyers).
131. The attorney who represented the prisoner before the Supreme Court in Bounds,
Barry Nakell, feels that there are a number of advantages to legal assistance programs over
prison law libraries including "competence, prompt action, the ability of lawyers to use
outside resources, the reduction of frivolous petitions, and the ability of lawyers to resolve
problems by methods other than litigation." Flores, supra note 2, at 287. The Bounds Court
itself notes that a majority of prison administrators supported creation and expansion of
legal assistance programs. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 829 n.18.
132. Holt v. Pitts, 702 F.2d 639, 640-41 (6th Cir. 1983); accord United States v. Wilson,
690 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 867 (1983); Storseth v. Spellman,
654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir.
1978); Carter v. Kamka, 515 F. Supp. 825, 833 (D. Md. 1980).
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where prisoners wish to proceed pro se at trial and have no intention of actively using their "standby counsel." '
As to the quality and quantity of services provided by prison
legal assistance plans, courts have not approved of the use of "dependent, untrained, and inadequately supervised individuals as the
sole means of giving inmates access to the courts. ' 13 4 In addition,
periodic assistance by a legal services program has been held unsuitable to satisfy the state's constitutional obligations. 3 5 In such
cases, particularly where prisoners have no access to a law library,
the state must provide inmates with "assistance by trained, skilled,
and independent legal personnel."' 3 Although these individuals
3 7 courts have ruled that constitutionally
are generally attorneys,"
adequate assistance can be rendered to prisoners by law students
and paralegals 3 ' in certain closely supervised situations. 39
IV. AccEss TO PRISON LAW LIBRARIES OR LEGAL ASSISTANCE As
ALTERNATIVES: ARE BOTH REQUIRED TO ASSURE MEANINGFUL
ACCESS TO THE COURTS?

As a corollary to its holding that prisoners have a fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts, the Court in Bounds v.
Smith140 also emphasized that states have a duty to insure "meaningful" access.' 4 ' By allowing states to choose either adequate law
libraries or alternative legal assistance programs to facilitate prisoner access in their penal institutions, the Court demonstrated little concern that the method chosen could adversely affect a prisoner's ability to prepare and file meaningful legal papers. 42 In
practice, however, any state establishing prison law libraries, or le133. See, e.g., Spates v. Manson, 644 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1981); Boston v. Stanton, 450 F.
Supp. 1049, 1057 (W.D. Mo. 1978); see infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
134. Walters, 615 F. Supp. at 340; see also Harrington v. Holshouser, 741 F.2d 66, 69-70
(4th Cir. 1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 584-85 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1041 (1981); Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 720-21 (5th Cir. 1980); Kendrick, 586 F.
Supp. at 1552; Canterino v. Wilson, 562 F. Supp. 106, 110-12 (W.D. Ky. 1983).
135. See Leeds v. Watson, 630 F.2d 674, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1980). However, the court indicated that periodic assistance combined with prisoners' access to a law library would have
satisfied constitutional requirements.
136. Walters, 615 F. Supp. at 340; see also Lovell v. Brennan, 566 F. Supp. 672, 696-97
(D. Me. 1983), aff'd, 728 F.2d 560 (1st Cir. 1984); Canterino, 562 F. Supp. at 110-12.
137. See generally Comment, supra note 6, at 982-83.
138. See generally J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 6, § 2.06, at 37-38.
139. See Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir. 1985).
140. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
141. See id. at 823.
142. See id. at 828 n.17.
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gal assistance plans, may have doomed some prisoners in the state
to anything but meaningful access since the right of meaningful
access to the courts is of an individual rather than a group nature. 14 3 Therefore, an access plan that may provide some, or even a
majority, of a state's prisoners with meaningful access to the
courts, may not be helpful to many prisoners who have an equally
compelling right to reject that plan and seek access in a way not
subscribed to by the state.
The constitutional flaw in the Bounds approach to meaningful
prisoner access can best be illustrated by an examination of two
types of prisoners affected most adversely when states are allowed
to choose either prison law libraries or legal assistance programs,
specifically, illiterate or poorly educated prisoners incarcerated in a
state that provides access exclusively through law libraries, or prisoners desirous of exercising their right to proceed with their criminal cases pro se who are incarcerated in a state that provides access exclusively through a legal assistance plan.
A.

Law Library Access: Illiterate and Undereducated Prisoners

The Bounds v. Smith 4 4 majority defended its position that an
adequate prison law library could provide inmates with meaningful
access to the courts 14 5 by stating that the "Court's experience indicates that pro se petitioners are capable of using lawbooks to file
cases raising claims that are serious and legitimate even if ultimately unsuccessful.' 46 However, contrary evidence appears so
overwhelming that Justice Stewart, in his dissent, may have been
more accurate when he wrota that "'meaningful access' to the federal courts can seldom be realistically advanced by the device of
making law libraries available to prison inmates untutored in their
use."' 47
State prisoners, as a class, are far less educated than the general
population. 4 As illustrated by federal statistics 49 compiled in
143. See Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 624 (5th Cir. 1985); accord Hooten v. Jenne,
786 F.2d 692, 697 (5th Cir. 1986).
144. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
145. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
146. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 826-27.
147. Id. at 836 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
148. See Comment, supra note 39, at 1281.

149. See id. at nn.21 & 22 (citing

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS

468 (1981); and the

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUS-
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1981, over thirty percent of all prisoners have less than an eighth
grade education, as opposed to only nine percent with less than an
eighth grade education among the general population. 150 Obviously, large numbers of those poorly educated inmates are illiterate
or functionally illiterate, making the value of law libraries to them
dubious at best. 5 '
The problems arising from a lack of comprehension of the content of legal materials are exacerbated by the inherent complexity
of many areas of the law, such as habeas corpus and civil rights
actions, that are of special interest to prisoners. 52 While the courts
have attempted to mitigate the difficulties that prisoners face in
researching and filing habeas corpus petitions and civil rights actions by requiring only that prisoners "set forth facts giving rise to
the cause of action,' 1 53 and have traditionally been very liberal
when evaluating prisoner complaints, 5 4 there is only so much that
most prisoners can accomplish due to a basic misunderstanding of
55
the substantive and procedural complexities of their cases.
Although Bounds states that an adequate prison law library,
without assistance by persons trained in the law, can serve as a
vehicle to satisfy prisoners' fundamental constitutional right to access the courts, subsequent opinions have openly questioned
whether library books, even if adequate in number, can truly provide inmates, particularly those who are illiterate or who do not
speak English, with "meaningful" access to the courts. 56 This criticism is based on the theory that the "adequacy of a prisoner's
right of access to the courts must be measured by the actual opportunity he or she has to raise a valid and meaningful claim
before the courts.' 57 This is in line with the Supreme Court's preTICE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROFILE OF STATE PRISON
INMATES: SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC FINDINGS FROM THE
TIONAL FACILITIES

1974

SURVEY OF INMATES OF STATE CORREC-

9-12 (1979)).

150. Id. at n.22.
151. See id. at 1281.
152. See id. at 1306.
153. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825.
154. See Comment, supra note 39, at 1307.
155. Id. at 1307-08.
156. See, e.g., Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 721 (5th Cir. 1980); Walters v. Thompson, 615
F. Supp. 330, 339 (N.D. 11 1985); Smith v. Bounds, 610 F. Supp. 597, 603-04 (E.D.N.C.
1985); Canterino v. Wilson, 562 F. Supp. 106, 111-12 (W.D. Ky. 1983); Glover v. Johnson,
478 F. Supp. 1075, 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Wetmore v. Fields, 458 F. Supp. 1131, 1142-43
(W.D. Wis. 1978); Wade v. Kane, 448 F. Supp. 678, 684-85 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd without
opinion, 591 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1979).
157. Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1096; accord Stevenson v. Reed, 391 F. Supp. 1375, 1380-81
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Bounds position, taken in Wolff v. McDonnell,158 that the due process clause assures that no one will be denied the opportunity to
present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights. This Court specifically stated that,
"[t]he recognition by the Court that prisoners have certain constitutional rights which can be protected by civil rights actions would
be diluted if inmates, often 'totally or functionally illiterate,' were
unable to articulate their complaints to the courts."' 5 9 In fact, the
Bounds opinion expressly allows states to create a situation in
which educationally disadvantaged prisoners can be effectively denied that access by simply allowing states to feel that they can satisfy their duty to provide all prisoners with meaningful access to
the courts by establishing prison law libraries.
To remedy this constitutional dilemma, a number of federal
courts have logically extended the Bounds holding by declaring
that, while states may continue to provide prisoners with access to
the courts through the establishment of adequate prison law libraries,16 0 their obligation does not end there. For those inmates without sufficient intellectual abilities or educational attainment to allow reasonable comprehension of their legal claims, the state also
must provide some form of direct legal assistance to help these
prisoners translate their complaints into a meaningful presentation.' 6 1 This assistance may be supplied by an attorney,1 62 but also
can be from a "free world person with paralegal training,"' 3 a
competent inmate writ-writer,'
or an inmate-operated law
165
clinic.
(N.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944 (1976).
158. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
159. Id. at 579.
160. See Cruz, 627 F.2d at 721.
161. See, e.g., id.; Walters, 615 F. Supp. at 339; Cody v. Hillard, 599 F. Supp. 1025, 106061 (D.S.D. 1984), aff'd, 799 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1986); Canterino, 562 F. Supp. at 110-11;
Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1096; Wade, 448 F. Supp. at 684.
162. See, e.g., Smith, 610 F. Supp. at 604 (state must devise a plan providing for assistance of counsel when library is ruled inadequate); Canterino, 562 F. Supp. at 112 (attorney
assistance necessary despite existence of an adequate law library).
163. Canterino,562 F. Supp. at 111.
164. See, e.g., Cruz, 627 F.2d at 721; Canterino, 562 F. Supp. at 111-12; Glover, 478 F.
Supp. at 1097; Wetmore, 458 F. Supp. at 1142. But cf. Smith, 610 F. Supp. at 602-05 (state
may not supplement law library access with untrained inmate paralegals).
165. See Wade, 448 F. Supp. at 684-85.
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The Impact of Bounds on Pro Se Defendants

As previously discussed, a state that satisfies its constitutional
duty to provide prisoners with meaningful access to the courts
through the establishment of legal assistance programs, using persons trained in the law to assist inmates in the preparation and
filing of legal papers, 16 6 cannot be compelled also to establish
prison law libraries. 167 While legal assistance programs arguably
are more meaningful for the average prisoner, lacking in reading
and comprehension skills, than a law library plan, they are decidedly less meaningful for a prisoner who, as a defendant in a criminal action, wishes to exercise his constitutional right of selfrepresentation.
The Supreme Court, in Faretta v. California,'68 ruled that a defendant has a constitutional right to conduct a pro se defense. 6 9
The Court stated that this right, which is "necessarily implied by
the structure of the [Sixth] Amendment,"7 0 grants the accused the
right to make his defense personally.' 7 ' Although the Court warned
that a pro se defendant probably would be better served by trained
counsel, 7 21 once the choice to proceed pro se is made, the state may
not prevent the jailed pro se defendant from preparing his defense. 73 Preparation has been defined as "having adequate time in
which to work and having materials available to do the legal research necessary to prepare [a] defense.'1 7 4 Speaking of the personal nature of sixth amendment rights, the Ninth Circuit has
stated that, "'[t]he rights to notice, confrontation, and compulsory
process' mean, at a minimum, that time to prepare and some access to materials and witnesses are fundamental to a meaningful
166. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
167. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
168. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
169. Id. at 836.
170. Id. at 819.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 834.
173. See Milton v. Morris, 767 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1985) (defendant who exercises
Faretta right to conduct his own defense should not be subjected to the possibility that,
through circumstances beyond his control, he will not be allowed to prepare his defense); see
also Note, The Jailed Pro Se Defendant and the Right to Preparea Defense, 86 YALE L.J.
292, 296 (1976) (adequate opportunity to prepare is a fundamental component of due process and the state cannot prevent a pro se defendant from preparing his defense because he
has chosen to exercise his constitutional right of self-representation).
174. Potuto, supra note 10, at 231.
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right of representation.' 17 5 This denotes access to law books, witnesses, and other tools, as necessary if the defendant hopes to ex176
ercise his pro se right in a meaningful way.
How can the sixth amendment guarantee that a pro se litigant
will be allowed to prepare and conduct his own defense be reconciled with the Bounds alternative access scheme that expressly allows states, with adequate prisoner legal assistance plans in place,
to refuse to supply library materials to inmates? The courts have
had difficulty in solving this conundrum. Some courts, while fully
recognizing the constitutional right to a pro se defense, have followed steadfastly the Bounds v. Smith 177 alternative access principle, holding that when legal assistance is available through a government-sponsored program, the state has met its constitutional
obligation and need not provide additional prison law libraries
simply because an inmate refuses legal representation and proceeds pro se.'17 Several courts have indicated that where a defendant desires to proceed pro se, the appointment of counsel to act as
an "informal legal advisor' 179 or "standby" attorney, l 0 whether his
services are used or not, discharges a state's constitutional duty to
provide prisoners' access to the courts. 8 1 In fact, the Supreme
Court has held that a pro se defendant's sixth amendment right to
conduct his own defense is not violated by the unsolicited participation of standby counsel 8 2 as long as the defendant has a "fair
chance to present his case in his own way."'8 3 A prisoner whose
access to legal materials is severed from the outset clearly will not
have any chance to present his case in any way.
175. Milton, 767 F.2d at 1446 (quoting Faretta,422 U.S. at 818).
176. See id.
177. 430 U.S. 817.
178. See, e.g., Corgain v. Miller, 708 F.2d 1241, 1250 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 867 (1983); Spates v.
Manson, 644 F.2d 80, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360
(4th Cir. 1978); Falzerano v. Collier, 535 F. Supp. 800, 803 (D.N.J. 1982); Carter v. Kamka,
515 F. Supp. 825, 833 (D. Md. 1980); Boston v. Stanton, 450 F. Supp. 1049, 1057 (W.D. Mo.
1978).
179. Boston, 450 F. Supp. at 1057.
180. Spates, 644 F.2d at 85.
181. See supra note 133 and accompanying text; accord United States v. West, 557 F.2d
151, 152-53 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). Contra Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F. Supp. 1368,
1387 (W.D. Pa. 1978). See generally Potuto, supra note 10, at 231-32 (it is an error to
assume that representation by an attorney adequate to satisfy Bounds can satisfy a state's
obligation to provide incarcerated defendants with legal materials since this would obviate
the pro se right).
182. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1983).
183. Id. at 177.
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Other courts have been willing to adopt a dual standard, allowing the state to make its Bounds choice while providing prisoners desiring to proceed pro se with adequate library materials.""
Although there are added costs and security problems involved in
supplying incarcerated pro se defendants with library materials,
these security problems seemingly have not proven insurmountable
for those states choosing the Bounds library option.'8 5
C.

Beyond Bounds: Law Libraries and Legal Assistance

Lost in the rush to establish state access plans is the fact that
the Court's avowed touchstone in Bounds v. Smith s" was "mean87
ingful access" for each prisoner incarcerated within a state.1
Rights and liberties are personal and not subject to an all-encompassing law of averages. In this vein, a number of courts, having
examined the diverse individual needs of prisoners within their
states' penal institutions, have arrived at the conclusion that the
Bounds alternative access rule is flawed and incapable of providing
the sort of "meaningful access" that the Court sought. The basic
thesis of these courts was stated eloquently by Wisconsin District
Court Judge James E. Doyle in Wetmore v. Fields s" when he
wrote that "the inferior courts should not be avid to discern in the
disjunctive 'or' as it appears in. . .Bounds too extreme a frugality
in the Supreme Court's vindication of prisoners' 'adequate, effective, and meaningful' access to the courts."' 9 In calling for a
broader, fairer interpretation of Bounds, Judge Fields summarized
the extreme dependency of prisoners on the judiciary and recommended a simple, direct rule to guide states and courts in their
attempts to bring truly meaningful access to prisoners:
So radically and massively does government assault individual freedom when it engages in imprisonment that, in my view, the due process clause should be held to require that through the weeks,
months, and years, prisoners be afforded abundant and effective
184. See, e.g., Owens-El, 442 F. Supp. at 1387; cf. Milton, 767 F.2d at 1446 (conclusion
based strictly on Faretta principles).
185. See generally Potuto, supra note 10, at 232-33 (general discussion of potential security problems associated with delivery of law books to incarcerated pro se defendants).
186. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
187. Id. at 823.
188. 458 F. Supp. 1131 (W.D. Wis. 1978).
189. Id. at 1142 (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822); accord Canterino v. Wilson, 562 F.
Supp. 106, 111 (W.D. Ky. 1983); Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1096 (E.D. Mich.
1979).
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means to mount challenges to particular conditions of confinement
for resolution by the judicial branch. Without regard to the degree
of formal education, intellectual powers, or gifts of expression of a
particular prisoner, he or she should be constitutionally entitled to a
choice among: adequate assistance from persons trained in the law,
direct access to truly adequate law libraries, and the opportunity for
assistance from fellow prisoners with legal research and writing. 90
Perhaps the first case to apply Judge Fields' broader view of
Bounds was Glover v. Johnson.9 ' In that case, the court expressly
ruled that to read Bounds as obligating a state to provide either an
adequate law library or an adequate legal assistance program was
to interpret the decision too narrowly. 1 92 The court further stated
that an adequate law library is of no meaningful use to prisoners
incapable of conducting basic legal research. 19 3 In such cases,
courts have recognized that inmates must be provided access to
individuals with legal research skills.'9 4
It was not until 1983, however, that the expanded prisoner access principles founded in Wetmore and Glover were carried to
their natural conclusion. In Canterino v. Wilson," 5 a Kentucky
federal district court ruled that, dependent upon the circumstances
in a particular prison, all constitutionally adequate legal access
plans must affirmatively include three elements:
First, some source of legal information of a professional nature must
be available to all inmates for the full legal development of their
claims. This may consist of an adequate law library available to all
inmates or qualified attorneys in sufficient number, or some combination of both. Secondly, for those inmates who possess insufficient
intellectual or educational abilities to permit reasonable comprehension of their legal claims, provision must be made to allow them to
communicate with someone who, after consultation with the legal
learning source, is capable of translating their complaints into an
understandable presentation . . ."I [Third,] [w]here these sources
190. Wetmore, 458 F. Supp. at 1142. Interestingly, Judge Fields did not decide the instant case in line with his expansive views of prisoner access, considering himself unhappily
obliged to follow the much narrower, traditional view expressed in Bounds.
191. 478 F. Supp. 1075.
192. Id. at 1096.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 562 F. Supp. 106.
196. "This goal may be accomplished for the unlearned inmate through an institutional
attorney, .

.

. paralegal, .

. or an inmate ...

writ-writer." Id. at 111; accord Kendrick v.
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of assistance are present, and no physical or coercive restraints to
prisoners complaints exist, due process mandating access to the
courts is met. 9 "
Thus, while preserving the state's choice betwen establishment of
law libraries and legal assistance plans as authorized by Bounds,
Canterino adds the additional element of alternative assistance for
prisoners who cannot make meaningful use of the option chosen.
With the addition of a fourth element recognizing the fundamental right of a prisoner to refuse state-offered assistance and
proceed with his case pro se, the Canterino approach represents a
step toward truly meaningful access for all prisoners as originally
anticipated, but never accomplished, under Bounds.
V.

CONCLUSION

Ten years after the Bounds v. Smith decision, it is clear that the
Supreme Court's alternative access approach is fatally flawed.
States establishing prison law libraries, to the exclusion of legal assistance programs, effectively bar access to the courts by the many
illiterate and poorly educated prisoners in the nation's penal institutions. On the other hand, states establishing legal assistance programs, to the exclusion of prison law libraries, violate a prisoner's
right to proceed pro se.
What is needed is a far-sighted approach, such as that expressed
in Canterino v. Wilson, to insure that all inmates, regardless of
circumstance and personal constitutional preference, will receive
the access to the courts most meaningful to them.

Bland, 586 F. Supp. 1536, 1549 (W.D. Ky. 1984).
197. Canterino,562 F. Supp. at 111.

